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Nature of the Case
Woodrow Grant asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Idaho
Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 34 (Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2014) (hereinafter, Opinion).
He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the orders summarily dismissing his petition
for relief without appointment of counsel, decided an issue of first impression in Idaho
by holding that, even in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, there is
no constitutional right to counsel in post conviction. That decision is also inconsistent
with those recent decisions from the United States Supreme Court, which suggest that
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there is a right to counsel in post conviction where the post conviction process is the
first practical opportunity for a defendant

challenge the ineffectiveness of trial

counsel.
Additionally, this Court should grant review because the Court of Appeals'
decision to affirm the summary dismissal of Mr. Grant's petition without appointing
counsel under Idaho's statutory framework was inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court
and Idaho Court of Appeals precedent. Notably, the Court of Appeals determined that
the district court applied the wrong standard as it addressed Mr. Grant's request for an
attorney. However, the majority decided

to affirm the district court's decision denying

counsel and summarily dismissing Mr. Grant's post conviction petition

on its own

reweighing of Mr. Grant's allegations. In so doing, the majority fell victim to the same
error it had found in the district court's analysis - it applied the wrong standard.
Specifically, it did not review Mr. Grant's allegations in the light most favorable to him
(i.e., considering the allegations as if they were true), but instead, determined that they
were disproved or not otherwise supported in the record. Judge Lansing dissented on
that point, and, applying the proper standard, opined that Mr. Grant had alleged the
possibility of valid claims. As a result, Judge Lansing would have vacated the district
court's orders and remanded the case for further proceedings with the assistance of
counsel.
On review, this Court should vacate the district court's decisions denying counsel
and summarily dismissing the petition and remand this case for further proceedings with
the assistance of appointed counsel.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Grant was incarcerated on three different convictions in three
possession

of methamphetamine,

and

cases

domestic assault).

(aggravated

battery,

(R., pp.1

He timely petitioned for post-conviction relief with regard to each case. 1

He alleged that his attorney had been deficient in multiple aspects of his representation
at the trial level. (R., pp.2-4.) Mr. Grant set forth the facts supporting his allegations in
his petition and attached an affidavit in support.

(R., pp.2-7.) In addition, he filed a

motion and affidavit in support of appointment of post-conviction counsel. (R., pp.9-11.)
These documents were notarized. (R., pp.7, 11.) The record does not indicate that the
ever
The
conviction

an answer or motion for summary dismissal. (See
court subsequently issued a notice of intent to dismiss the post. (R., pp.23-49.) In that notice, it also denied Mr.

request for

the assistance of post-conviction counsel because, it asserted, he did not allege facts
raising the possibility of a valid claim.

(R., p.27.)

It then articulated its reasons for

dismissing his various claims. (R., pp.28-49.) The most prevalent of its rationales was
that Mr. Grant had not presented any evidence other than his own allegations, which the
district court described as conclusory, unsupported, or unsubstantiated. (R., pp.31, 37,
38, 39, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48.)

It also reasoned that Mr. Grant had not proven his

allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, or otherwise produced sufficient or

1

In regard to the aggravated battery charge, Mr. Grant had originally been placed on
probation following a successful period of retained jurisdiction. (R., p.1.) That probation
was subsequently revoked. (R., p.1.) Therefore, in regard to that case, his petition for
post-conviction relief is only timely from the order revoking probation. In the other two
cases, the petition was timely from the judgments of conviction. (See R., p.1.)
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facts to

a claim for relief. 2 (R., pp.37, 39, 40, 41, 48.) Along those same

lines, the district court indicated that Mr. Grant needed to present facts which
demonstrated the outcome of his case "would have been different but for his attorney's
unprofessional errors," in order to survive summary dismissal. (See, e.g., R., pp.47; see
also R., pp.95, 96, 106.)

Mr. Grant filed a motion to amend the petition and a response to the district
court's notice of intent to dismiss.
notarized.

(R., p.60.)

(R., pp.50-60.)

As before, his assertions were

He alleged additional, more-specific facts that supported his

various claims. (R., pp.52-60.) Those clarifications revealed that Mr. Grant was making
two overarching

First, he contended that

and prejudicial performance.

trial attorney had

Specifically, he alleged his attorney had not

moved for a change of venue or the district court judge's recusal, had not presented
mitigating evidence concerning the impact of his mental condition, had not elicited
testimony regarding the improper investigation of the underlying cases, had not
informed him of his rights, pursuant to Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561 (2006), and
had not allowed him an opportunity to review the Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter, PSI) or assisted him to object to information improperly included therein.

(R., pp.52-59.)
Second, as to the two cases in which his petition was timely from the judgments
of conviction, Mr. Grant contended his pleas were invalid.

Specifically, he alleged:

(1) he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently enter his guilty pleas because of his
2

As a result of this perspective, the district court apparently did not regard the facts
Mr. Grant alleged in his verified pleadings and affidavits as evidence that it could
consider, or, at least, did not accept those factual allegations as true. (See generally,
R., pp.23-49.)
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attorney's improper assurances that he would receive concurrent sentences and the
opportunity to participate in the rider program; and, (2) he was incompetent

the time

he entered the plea due to a severe depressive episode caused by his bi-polar disorder.
(R.,

pp.56~58.)

Along with his response to the notice of intent to dismiss, Mr. Grant also

renewed his request for appointment of post-conviction counsel. (R., p.59.) As part of
that request he asserted that, in addition to the facts he had already alleged to be true,
there was existing evidence he was unable to collect or present to the district court due
to his incarceration, but which he claimed would provide additional support for his
allegations. (SeeR., p.59.)
Nevertheless, the district court summarily
conviction relief. It asserted that Mr. Grant's

Mr. Grant's petition for
to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss

"did not include any additional documents or affidavits." (R., p.86.) Again, as it went
through Mr. Grant's specific allegations, the district court reasoned that he had not
presented any evidence other than his own allegations, which it still considered to be
conclusory, unsupported, or unsubstantiated. (R., pp.86, 90, 92, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101,
102, 103, 104, 105, 106.) It also continued to assert that Mr. Grant had not proven his
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, or otherwise produced sufficient or
adequate facts to state a claim for relief. (R., pp.98, 100, 104.) Additionally, it decided
that Mr. Grant needed to present facts which demonstrated "the outcome of his case
would have been different" in order to survive summary dismissal. (R., p.106; see also
R., pp.95, 96.) It also denied Mr. Grant's renewed motion for post-conviction counsel
for the same reason it had before. (R., p.90.)
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Mr. Grant subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing
his petition pursuant to I.R.C.

59(e) and 60(b). (R.,

pp.65~85.)

Again, the document

was verified by a notary public. (R., p.85.) In that motion, Mr. Grant alleged additional
facts which supported several of his claims. (See R., pp.69-84.) Three months later,
the district court determined that Mr. Grant had simply
and that he did not argue that the district court had made any errors of law or fact in its
initial decision, and so, it denied that motion. (R., p.115.) Mr. Grant filed a notice of
appeal which is timely as to all the district court's decisions. 3
On appeal, Mr. Grant argued that, in light of recent United
Idaho should recognize a due process right
argued that, under Idaho's
summarily dismiss his petition

Supreme Court

counsel in post conviction. He

conviction statutes, the district court's decision to
appointing counsel was erroneous because it

applied the wrong standards in reaching that decision. The Court of Appeals held that
there was no constitutional right to counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings, since
there has been no express ruling to that effect from the United States Supreme Court.
(Opinion, pp.2-3.)

Reviewing the decision to deny counsel under Idaho's post

conviction statutes, the Court of Appeals determined that the district court had, in fact,
applied the wrong standards in reaching its decision to deny Mr. Grant counsel and
summarily dismissing his petition for relief. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that

3

The final judgment dismissing Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction relief conforming
with the requirements from the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure was entered on June 13,
2013, in response to the Idaho Supreme Court's order on that same date. I.A.R.
17(e)(2) allows that a notice of appeal filed prior to the entry of an appealable order will
become valid upon the filing of the appealable judgment. Weller v. State, 146 Idaho
652, 653-54 (Ct. App. 2008). Therefore, Mr. Grant's September 21, 2011, notice of
appeal is timely from the final judgment.

6

the district court improperly required Mr. Grant to present evidence proving his claims
by a propensity

the evidence, rather than viewing

allegations in the light most

favorable to Mr. Grant (i.e., considering them as if they were true). (Opinion, p.6 n.4.)
However, the Court of Appeals split on the proper result following its determination of
error in that regard.
The majority decided that it could independently review Mr. Grant's allegations
and affirm the order denying counsel and summarily dismissing the petition based the
majority's own assessment of the validity of Mr. Grant's allegations.
pp.3-11.)

(See Opinion,

To that end, it found that the record either disproved Mr. Grant's allegations

e.g., Opinion, pp. 7, 10), or that

allegations were

insufficiently

articulated to present potentially viable claims (see, e.g., Opinion, pp.6-11 ).

Judge

Lansing dissented, finding that the allegations made by Mr. Grant, if accepted as
raised the possibility of valid claims. (Opinion, pp.11-14, Lansing, J., dissenting in part.)
As such, Judge Lansing would have vacated the decision denying Mr. Grant counsel
and remanded the case for further proceedings with the assistance of counsel.
(Opinion, p.14, Lansing, J., dissenting in part.)
Mr. Grant filed a timely petition for review from the Court of Appeals' Opinion.
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1.

Whether the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming the summary dismissal of
Mr. Grant's petition for post conviction relief without the appointment of counsel
decides an issue of substance not yet addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in
a manner that is inconsistent with recent decisions from the United States
Supreme Court.
Whether the majority op1mon affirming the denial of Mr. Grant's motion for
appointment of counsel and summarily dismissing his petition for relief under
Idaho's statutory framework was inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court and
Idaho Court of Appeals precedent

3.

Whether the district court erred by not appointing Mr. Grant counsel under
Idaho's statutory framework.
Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Grant's petition
for post-conviction relief without properly considering the undisputed factual
he made in his verified petition and affidavit in support that petition.

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The Summary Dismissal Of Mr. Grant's
Petition For Post Conviction Relief Without The Appointment Of Counsel Decides An
Issue Of Substance Not Yet Addressed By The Idaho Supreme Court In A Manner That
Is Inconsistent With Recent Decisions From The United States Supreme Court

A.

Standard For Evaluating Petitions For Review
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only

"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the decision
of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme
I.A.R. 118(b ).

This exercise of discretion is not completely

118(b) provides some factors which must be considered in evaluating

. Rule
petition for

review, including:
1)

Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not yet
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court;

2)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court;

3)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior
decisions;

I.A.R. 118(b). In regard to the argument that there is a due process right to counsel
during initial-review collateral proceedings, Mr. Grant contends that there are special
and important reasons for review to be granted. First, the Court of Appeals has decided
a question of substance not yet decided by the Idaho Supreme Court- whether, in light
of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, there is a due process right to
counsel in post conviction.

See I.A.R. 118(b)(1 ).

Second, the Court of Appeals'

decision in that regard is inconsistent with those recent United States Supreme Court

9

I.A.

118(b)(2).

For those reasons, this Court should

its

authority in this case.

8.

Idaho Should Recognize A Constitutional Right To Counsel In Initial-Review
Collateral Challenges To The Effectiveness Of Trial Counsel Under The State
And Federal Constitutions
As part of its promise of due process, the Fourteenth Amendment provides a

right to counsel in certain situations.

See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401

(1985) ("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant
discretionary elements, it must nonetheless
Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with
contends

in accord with the dictates of the
Due Process Clause.") Mr. Grant

one such situation arises during initial·-review collateral proceedings, such

as when a petitioner

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time

in post conviction in Idaho.

In fact, the United States Supreme Court recently

suggested that there is a constitutional right to that effect:
Coleman had suggested, though without holding, that the Constitution
may require States to provide counsel in initial-review collateral
proceedings because "in [these] cases, ... state collateral review is the
first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction." As
Coleman noted, this makes the initial-review collateral proceeding a
prisoner's "one and only appeal" as to an ineffective-assistance claim, and
this may justify an exception to the constitutional rule that there is no right
to counsel in collateral proceedings.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 755 (1991 )).
However, the United States Supreme Court decided not to answer that question
in Martinez because, "[w]hile petitioner frames the question in this case as a
constitutional one, a more narrow, but still dispositive, formulation is whether a federal
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habeas court may excuse a procedural default of an ineffective-assistance claim when
the claim was not properly presented in state court due to an attorney's errors in an
initial-review collateral proceeding." /d. at 1313. The Supreme Court concluded that, as
a matter of equity, the federal courts could not procedurally default such claims. See
generally id.

As a result, the United States Supreme Court reversed that decision

dismissing the habeas petition and remanded the case for a determination on the
substantive issues raised: whether Mr. Martinez's post conviction counsel had been
ineffective and whether his underlying claim (ineffective assistance of trial counsel) was
substantial. /d. at 1320-21.
it

counsel in initial-review collateral

reasons why

may

to

a right to

ings which challenge the effectiveness of trial

counsel for the first time. As the United States Supreme Court explained, there is a
violation of the petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights when he is left without the
assistance of counsel during his "one and only appeal." /d. at 1315 (citing Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)). The Supreme Court pointed out that "[w]here ... the

initial-review collateral proceeding is the first designated proceeding for a prisoner to
raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial, the collateral proceeding is in many ways
the equivalent of a prisoner's direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim." /d.
As such, "[w]ithout the help of an adequate attorney, a prisoner will have similar
difficulties vindicating a substantial ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim." /d.
For example, the Supreme Court explained that during such a "first-tier"
proceeding, pro se petitioners '"are generally ill equipped to represent themselves
because they do not have a brief from counsel or an opinion of the court addressing

11

their claim of error."'
(2005)).

/d.

1317 (quoting Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U

Furthermore, the Supreme Court recognized

605, 617

"[c]laims of ineffective

assistance at trial often require investigative work and an understanding of trial
strategy," implying that applicants for post-conviction relief often could not engage in
that necessary investigation, but appointed counsel could. 4 !d.

As such, the United

States Supreme Court concluded:
When the issue [of ineffective assistance of counsel] cannot be raised on
direct review, . . . a prisoner asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim in an initial-review collateral proceeding cannot rely on a
court opinion or the prior work of an attorney addressing that claim. To
present a claim
ineffective assistance at trial in accordance with the
's procedures,
a prisoner likely needs an
attorney.
/d. (citing J-lalbert,

U.S. at 619) (emphasis added).

as though, given the chance, the United

on all this

it

Supreme Court will hold that

the applicant has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel during the initialreview collateral proceeding, particularly if that collateral proceeding is separate from
the direct appeal. See id. at 1315-17. In fact, in his dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out
that the practical effect of the Martinez ruling and actually establishing a constitutional

4

Mr. Grant specifically alleged that this was so in his case: "Because of [Mr.] Grant's
status as an incarcerated individual, it is almost impossible for him to present evidence
[as the district court is requiring]." (R., p.59.) Specifically, Mr. Grant asserted that he
"1. [Is f]airly ignorant of the law and evidentiary requirements[;] II. Cannot go and collect
paperwork and testimony in person[;] Ill. Is unsure of what evidence this Court would
consider important and pertinent[;] IV. And is unable to properly write up a response that
is adequate and up to the high standards this Court is accustomed to." (R., p.59.) As
such, according to the United States Supreme Court, he "likely needs an effective
attorney." Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (emphasis added).
12

is, for all intents
and

uu'''"'"' the same.

5

Martinez, 132

Ct. at 1321

,1

(Scalia, J., dissenting).

It is true that Martinez was addressing a state system where there was a
categorical bar to raising challenges to the effectiveness of trial counsel during the
direct appeal process, and it is also true that Idaho

not employ such a system.

However, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the rule from Martinez
applies to states with systems like Idaho's: "a distinction between (1) a State that denies
permission to raise the claim on direct appeal and (2) a State that in theory grants
permission but, as a matter

procedural design and systematic operation, denies a

meaningful opportunity to do so is a distinction without difference." Trevino v. Thaler,
133

Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013).

Since, "as a matter of its structure, design, and

operation," Idaho's judicial system "does not offer most defendants a meaningful
opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal,"
the rule and analysis from Martinez applies against Idaho's post conviction system. 6

5

State courts have also recognized that Martinez, in effect, has recognized a right to
counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings.
For example, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court pointed out: "In short, this new equitable rule in practice can be just as
coercive as the recognition of a new right. ... " Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562,
583-84 (Pa. 2013). Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court noted: "Although
choosing not to decide the issue, the United States Supreme Court explained the
rationale for finding a constitutional right to counsel in 'initial-review collateral
proceedings."' State v. Quixal, 70 A.3d 749, 754-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
6
In fact, the federal courts for the District of Idaho have consistently been applying the
rule from Martinez in cases arising out of Idaho convictions. See, e.g., See, e.g.,
Eby v. Blades, 2014 WL 1379656, p.9 (D. Idaho Apr. 8, 2014) (unpublished) (Magistrate
Judge Williams presiding); Veenstra v. Smith, 2014 WL 1270626, p.11 (D. Idaho
Mar. 26, 2014) (unpublished) (Chief Judge Winmill presiding); Gable v. Wengler, 2013
WL 4097711, p.8 (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2013) (unpublished) (Magistrate Judge Bush
presiding); Tellez-Vasquez v. Smith, 2013 WL 4039462, p.3 (D. Idaho Aug. 7, 2013)
(unpublished) (Magistrate Judge Dale presiding), vacated; Horozny v. Smith, 2013 WL
3776372, p.2 (D. Idaho Jul. 16, 2013) (unpublished) (District Judge Lodge presiding).
13

e.g., Matthews v. State, 1

Idaho 801, 806 (1992) ("[A] petition

post~conviction

ief is the preferred forum for bringing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.");
see a/so State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008) (noting that, if a defendant
pursues a claim of ineffective assistance in the direct appeal, he cannot then bring the
same claim in post-conviction); State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1999)
(reaffirming that "it is usually inappropriate to raise ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction," explaining that, "claims of
ineffective assistance regularly raise issues on which no evidence was presented at the
defendant's trial. . .

the trial record on direct appeal is rarely adequate for review of

claims.").
Additionally, the Supreme Court pointed out that recognition of such a right would
only constitute an exception to the general rule that there is no constitutional right to
counsel. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755 (identifying the general rule arising from the
decisions in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), and Finley v. Pennsylvania, 481
U.S. 551 (1987)). To that point, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently relied on Finley
to conclude that "there is no Sixth Amendment Right to counsel in a collateral attack
upon a conviction." 7 Murphy v. State,_ Idaho_, 2014 WL 712695, pp.5-6 (Feb.
25, 2014), not yet final; see also Fol/inus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 902-03 (Ct. App.
7

This Court has repeatedly recognized the general rule from Finley- that there is no
constitutional right to counsel in post conviction. Mr. Grant is not asking the Court to
overrule that interpretation of Finley. Rather, he is asking that this Court recognize an
exception to Finley based on the language in Martinez. To the extent that this Court
determines recognizing an exception to Finley because there is a constitutional right to
counsel in the initial-review collateral proceedings based on the language in Martinez
requires overruling its own precedent, it should do so, since the language in Martinez
demonstrates why such precedent would be manifestly wrong, unjust, or unwise. See
Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592-93 (2006)
(quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990)).
14

1995). However, the decision in Murphy

not appear to have taken

generally Murphy, 2014 WL 712695. Therefore, the issue

into
whether

there is an exception to the general rule in Finley is an issue of first impression in Idaho.
In fact, given the discussion in Martinez about the reasons that a petitioner
raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time in initial-review
collateral proceedings needs the assistance of counsel, the conclusion that there is no
right to counsel in such cases is erroneous, at least insofar as the due process clause
would allow a right to counsel in such situations.

Basically, the decision in Martinez

suggests that, while a post conviction system such as the one Idaho employs is
and based on sound reasoning, employing such a system
consequences for the

implementing it.

Martinez, 1

S. Ct. at 1318 ("By

deliberately choosing to move trial-ineffectiveness claims outside of the direct-appeal
process, where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the State significantly diminishes
prisoners' ability to file [or effectively pursue] such claims.") Of important note here is
the Supreme Court's implication that a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
would traditionally be presented at a time when the defendant has a constitutional right
to counsel.

See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.

The logical conclusion is that the

constitutional protection of the right to counsel cannot be avoided by the procedural
expedient of requiring the claim to be brought by a different process.

Compare

Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (not allowing the State to circumvent a

constitutional protection (double jeopardy) by a mere procedural mechanism (charging
two crimes instead of one based on meaningless distinctions)).

15

Idaho should answer the Supreme Court's open question and decide whether
is

due

right to counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings. After all,

the federal district court in the District of Idaho have already recognized that Idaho's
post-conviction procedures fall within the scope of the Martinez holding based on the
decision in Trevino, and so, have begun deciding the merits of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in the place of Idaho's courts. (See footnote 5, supra, page 13.)
Therefore, for the reasons discussed by the United States Supreme Court in
Martinez and Trevino, this Court should recognize the due process right to counsel

during initial-review collateral proceedings.
court's
conviction

As a result, it should reverse the district

Mr. Grant the assistance of counsel on his petition for postand remand this case for further proceedings with instructions that the

district court appoint counsel to assist Mr. Grant.

II.
The Majority Opinion Affirming The Denial Of Mr. Grant's Motion For Appointment
Of Counsel And Summarily Dismissing His Petition For Relief Under Idaho's
Statutory Framework Was Inconsistent With Idaho Supreme Court And Idaho
Court Of Appeals Precedent
Should this Court decide that there is no constitutional right to post-conviction
counsel in Idaho, it should still grant review because the Court of Appeals' Opinion
affirming the denial of counsel under Idaho's post conviction statute is inconsistent with
Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals precedent. See I.A.R. 118(2)-(3).
The Court of Appeals found that the district court had applied the wrong standard
in its decisions to deny counsel and summarily dismiss the petition:
The district court, throughout its notice of intent to dismiss, which the
district court cited as the basis for denial of the appointment of counsel,

16

repeatedly found Grant failed to present any admissible evidence and
presented only bare, conc!usory allegations.
We note that verified
pleadings, with respect to facts within a petitioner's personal knowledge,
are admissible evidence. These types of allegations by a petitioner differ
from allegations that address facts outside the personal knowledge of a
petitioner or those based on pure speculation.
Furthermore, when
requesting appointed counsel, a petitioner does not need to support his or
her claims with admissible evidence. Indeed, one of the important
functions of counsel may be to assist in finding and presenting admissible
evidence. The petitioner need only allege facts which raise the possibility
of a valid claim. The district court's order demonstrates it failed to make
this distinction when addressing Grant's claims.
(Opinion, p.6 n.4 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).)
As Judge Lansing pointed out, the proper response to the district court's error
was to remand

case for the district court for appointment of

and

consideration of

under the proper standards. (Opinion, pp.11-1

J.,

dissenting in part.) However, the majority rejected that remedy, instead, affirming the
order summarily dismissing the petition without appointment of counsel based on its
own review of the allegations in light of the record.

That decision is problematic on

several levels. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "it is essential that
the petitioner be given adequate notice of the claimed defects [in his allegations] so he

has an opportunity to respond . . . . " Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001 ),
superceded by statute as stated in Charboneau v. State (hereinafter, Charboneau 1),
140 Idaho 789, 793 (2004) (noting that the statute requires the opportunity to respond
as well). Since Mr. Grant does not have an opportunity to respond to the majority's
reassessment of his allegations, the majority's opinion runs afoul of this requirement.
However, the most evident problem with the majority's decision is that, in reweighing the
claims, the majority fell victim to the same error the district court did - it applied the
wrong standard.

17

In properly reviewing a request for appointment of post conviction counsel, "a
must review the facts in a light

favorable to the petitioner, and determine

whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if accepted as true."

State v.

Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995). As this Court reaffirmed, "the task of this
Court 'is to determine whether the appellant has alleged facts in his petition that if true,
would entitle him to relief."' 8

e.g., State v. Baldwin, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2007)

(quoting Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) (hereinafter, Charboneau /)
(emphasis added). 9
The error in the majority's review in this case
that "Grant's claim of
forrns." 10

clearly evidenced by its decision

assistance is disproved by his guilty plea advisory

(Opinion, p.7 (discussing Mr. Grant's allegation that his attorney failed

8

The requirement that the reviewing court consider Mr. Grant's allegations as true is
particularly applicable in this case since the State did not file an answer, and so
Mr. Grant's allegations are unrebutted. (See generally R.; see also RoAs.) "A court is
required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true .... " State v. Baldwin,
145 Idaho 148, 153 (2007) (emphasis added).
9
Mr. Grant recognizes that the Court was reviewing a decision to summarily dismiss a
petition for relief in Saykhamchone and Baldwin, and not the decision to deny a motion
for post conviction counsel. However, the standards regarding construing evidence in
the petitioner's favor applies to reviews of denials of request for counsel because, as
this Court indicated in Charboneau/, the standard for demonstrating the possibility of a
valid claim (meriting appointment of counsel) is less stringent than demonstrating a
genuine issue of material fact (meriting an evidentiary hearing). See Charboneau I, 140
Idaho at 792-93 (quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679). Presumably, for this reason, this
Court quoted the standard regarding construing evidence from Saykhamchone in the
section of the Charboneau I opinion which addressed the denial of the petitioner's
motion for counsel. /d. at 793 (quoting Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 321 ).
10
While the "disproved by the record" standard may be applicable during summary
dismissal proceedings, see, e.g., McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2009), it is only
really applicable when the court is assessing allegations regarding a fact which cannot
be disputed, not when assessing two statements for their veracity.
For example, where a petitioner alleged that he did not enter a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary plea when he pled guilty to murder because he did not know
that the victim had not died, but, in fact, he had only pled guilty to aggravated battery,
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advise him as required by Estrada) (emphasis added); see a/so Opinion, p.1 0 (making a
similar determination regarding Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney made inappropriate
promises about his guilty plea).)

The fact that the Court of Appeals concluded that

Mr. Grant's claim was disproved ipso facto means that it did not evaluate the allegation
as if it were true or in the light most favorable to him. In fact, as the majority itself had
just noted: "The petitioner need only allege facts which raise the possibility of a valid
claim."

(Opinion, p.6 n.4 (emphasis in original).)

Mr. Grant did exactly that - he

alleged that his attorney had not advised him of his rights under Estrada, and he alleged
that his attorney made impermissible promises about his guilty plea and the sentence
could expect to receive.
regardless of

If Mr. Grant is

other evidence may contradict

if those allegations are true
(i.e., that the allegations are

considered as if they are true and the other evidence considered to be erroneous),
Mr. Grant would be entitled to relief on each point. Therefore, Mr. Grant alleged the

then the petitioner's allegation would be clearly disproved by the record, such as the
documents from the change of plea hearing and the judgment of conviction. The fact
that he pled guilty to aggravated battery cannot be disproved by any assertion to the
contrary that the petitioner subsequently makes.
However, the "disproved by the record" standard is not applicable when the court
is evaluating the veracity of two inconsistent statements. The fact that the two
statements are inconsistent does not inherently demonstrate that one is true and the
other is not. That determination is necessarily dependent on an examination of the
declarant's explanations for the inconsistency between the two statements (which, in
post conviction, occurs at an evidentiary hearing). In that case, the presence of the two
contradictory statements simply creates a genuine issue of material fact as to which of
the two statements is true.
As a result, the "disproved by the record" standard does not apply to demonstrate
that the statements Mr. Grant made in support of his petition are definitively false for the
sole reason that he made contradictory statements at the guilty plea hearing. Such a
holding would be equivalent to disregarding a witness's recantation of her testimony
simply because she offered the contradictory (and now-recanted) testimony at trial.
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possibility of valid claims, and, as such, was entitled to the

Opinion, pp.13-14, Lansing, J.,

of counsel.

in part.)

The same is true regarding Mr. Grant's allegations that defense counsel was
ineffective for not presenting mitigating evidence at sentencing. (See Opinion, pp.8-9
(affirming the denial of counsel and summary dismissal of that allegation because the
presentation of evidence is left to counsel's strategic discretion). There are two flaws in
that reasoning:

first, it presumes that the decision to not present that evidence was

actually strategic, and not an oversight by defense counsel.

Second, even if the

decision were strategic, that decision could still constitute ineffective
counsel if it were the product of ignorance

of

the law, insufficient preparation, or

such factors. As Judge Lansing reminded the majority, review of the decision
counsel does not require the petitioner to prove his claims, since part of the point of
having counsel is developing the claims. (Opinion, p.13, Lansing, J., dissenting in part.)
Therefore, Judge Lansing correctly pointed out that the majority's reliance on the "sound
trial strategy" rationale for summarily dismissing the claim was prematurely applied,
since, with assistance of counsel, Mr. Grant could have identified and provided
additional evidence showing that counsel's decisions were not sound trial strategy.
(Opinion, p.13, Lansing, J., dissenting in part.)

Therefore, Mr. Grant alleged the

possibility of a valid claim in that regard as well.
Because the majority, like the district court before it, failed to apply the proper
standard of review, this Court should exercise its review authority.
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Ill.

Statutory Framework

A.

Introduction
Idaho law permits appointment of post-conviction counsel if the petitioner

demonstrates the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim.

I.C. § 19-4904;

Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 792-93. Since the facts Mr. Grant alleged demonstrated
the possibility of valid post conviction claims, this Court should reverse the district
court's order denying appointment of post-conviction counsel, as well as the order
summarily dismissing the petition,

remand this case for further

with the

of counsel.

B.

Applicable Legal Standards
The elements of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are two-fold:

counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable (i.e., deficient); and there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for those errors
{i.e., prejudicial).

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984 ); Estrada, 143

Idaho at 561. An applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to appointment of counsel
if he "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho
651, 654 (2007); see also Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.

Allegations of fact

contained in the verified pleadings are properly considered as evidence in support of the
petition. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Loveland v. State,
141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005).
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For

of his claims, Mr. Grant alleged

in his verified petition which show

possibility of a valid claim, in that his assertions of fact support at least one,
if not both of the elements under Strickland. (See R.,

pp.1~8,

50-64.) Therefore, he

should have had counsel appointed during the post-conviction proceedings.

C.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Advise Him Of
His Right To Remain Silent During The Psychological Evaluation Per The Idaho
Supreme Court's Decision In Estrada
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that counsel's performance is objectively

deficient if counsel fails to advise a defendant of his right to remain silent during a
143 Idaho

psychological evaluation.

564; Murray v.
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Idaho 159, 167 (2014) (reaffirming that counsel is deficient if he fails to advise his client
regarding the client's rights under Estrada). This right to silence is well-established in
precedent and applies in regard to all psychological evaluations occurring before
sentencing. Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 46 (2009); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860,
871 (1989). This is because, unlike a routine presentence investigation, which relies
heavily on information already available through public records, a psychological
evaluation delves into more personal areas of the defendant's life, and thereby,
presents a greater risk of self-incrimination. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562. Therefore, if
counsel failed to inform Mr. Grant of his right to remain silent during the psychological
evaluations conducted prior to his sentencing, that performance was deficient. /d. at
564.
Mr. Grant alleged in his verified pleadings that his attorney did not advise him
about his Estrada rights in regard to the psychological evaluation conducted as part of

22

the presentence investigation. (R., pp.3, 6, 54.) Mr. Grant also alleged that information
obtained during this interview was

against him

his sentencing hearing.

(R., p.54.) Since the facts articulated in the verified pleadings were within Mr. Grant's
personal knowledge, they constitute evidence that the district court could consider.

Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. As such, Mr. Grant alleged facts which demonstrate a possibly
valid claim

that his attorney's performance was deficient and prejudiced him.

Therefore, because he alleged facts which show the possibility of a valid claim in this
regard, counsel should have been appointed and the decision to deny him counsel was
in error.
The district

denied Mr. Grant's

for an attorney on this

on its review of a guilty plea questionnaire filled out by Mr. Grant.

(R., p.98 (citing

"Guilty Plea Questionnaire Form, Idaho Criminal Rules Appendix A, April 22, 2010,
2"). 11 Mr. Grant's answers in those questionnaires do not, however, justify the district
court's decision to deny Mr. Grant post-conviction counsel. All Mr. Grant had to do was
present facts which showed the possibility of a valid claim.
To that end, those allegations are to be considered in the light most favorable to
Mr. Grant (i.e., as if they were true, regardless of what other information may be in the
record). See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 792. While the

11

By referring to that questionnaire, the district court impliedly took judicial notice of that
document. However, Mr. Grant filled out separate questionnaires in CR-2009-19445-FE
and CR-19451, both of which bear the date "April 22, 201 0." As the Court of Appeals
noted, these questionnaires were not included in the appellate record. (Opinion, p.7
n.5.) In his appellant's brief, Mr. Grant indicated that he was intending to file a motion
asking this Court for an order taking judicial notice of those documents. (App. Br., p.16
n.16.) However, due to an oversight, appellate counsel failed to file that motion.
Appellate counsel apologizes for that error and has filed that motion contemporaneously
with this brief.
23

questionnaire

remind the defendant that he still retains some right to remain silent

Augmentation

Guilty

Questionnaire, p.2), that reminder does not disprove

the allegation or mean that the claim is meritless. The Kentucky Supreme Court has
articulated this concept best:
[W]hile the representation of a defendant, his attorney, and the prosecutor
at a Boykin hearing,C 2J as well as any findings by the judge accepting the
plea, "constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral
proceedings,"
if there is proof that the
representations "were so much the product of such factors as
misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others as to make the
guilty plea a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment.

Fraser

v.

Commonwealth,

59

S.W.3d

448,

457

(Ky.

2001)

(quoting

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74-75 (1977)) (emphasis added); cf. Murray, 156
Idaho at 167.

In Murray, this Court determined that, while the petitioner had shown

deficient performance by his attorney, he had failed to show prejudice in light of his
answers on the guilty plea questionnaire. Murray, 156 Idaho at 167-68. That decision
does not mean, however, that a petitioner could not ever show prejudice in light of such
statements. See Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 457. As such, Mr. Grant's allegation that his
attorney had not adequately advised him regarding his rights under Estrada, which this
Court has held does constitute deficient performance, raises the possibility of a valid
claim.
Therefore, and for all the reasons articulated in the Appellant's Brief, which are
incorporated herein by reference thereto (App. Br., pp.15-21 ), Mr. Grant's verified
allegations make out the possibility of a valid claim under Estrada. Thus, the decision to
deny Mr. Grant the assistance of counsel was erroneous.

12

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 246-47 (1969).
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D.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Present A Possible Valid Claim That His Attorney
Provided Ineffective Assistance By Not Reviewing The PSI With Mr. Grant Or
Assisting Him To Object To Erroneous Or Unreliable Information Contained In
The PSI
The information included in PSis must be reliable; otherwise, it is inappropriate

for the district court to consider it at sentencing. I.C.R. 32(e)(1). Information included in
a

I may be presumed reliable if the defendant is afforded an opportunity to challenge,

explain, or rebut that information.

State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 263 (1998 ).

Mr. Grant alleged in his response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss his
claim that he had been deprived of that opportunity because his attorney had failed to
PSI with him or to assist him in challenging erroneously-included or
unreliable information contained therein.

(R., p.56.)

Such a failure is

objectively unreasonable performance by an attorney, particularly because erroneouslyincluded or unreliable information in a PSI can haunt a defendant in numerous future
proceedings. See Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262 n.1. As a result, those allegations also
demonstrate the prejudice of counsel's ineffective performance. See id.
Therefore, since the verified and unrefuted facts Mr. Grant alleged presented a
possible valid claim for post-conviction relief, counsel should have been appointed
and the decision to deny him counsel was in error.

E.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate A Possible Valid Claim Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel That His Attorney Provided Ineffective
Assistance By Not Presenting Certain Mitigating Evidence
In regard to Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by

not presenting certain mitigating evidence at sentencing, the district court noted in its
notice of intent to dismiss that Mr. Grant had not identified what mitigating evidence his
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attorney had purportedly failed to present, and so he had not sufficiently supported his
claim. (R., pp.38-39.)
However, in his response to that notice of intent to dismiss, Mr. Grant did identify
the evidence to which he was referring. (R., pp.52-53, 56-59.) Specifically, he alleged
that there were two witnesses, one of whom would have contradicted the victim's
version of events and who would have testified as to the overall inadequacies of the
investigation, and another who would have testified that the police had '"lost' testimony"
or other evidence that should have been presented to the district court. (R., pp.58-59.)
In addition, he explained that

were several mental health examination reports

which would demonstrate

should have

considered for

health court,

or that would otherwise

provided the district court with a more complete

perspective of his mental health issues. 13 (R., pp.52-53, 56-57.) The failure to present
mitigating evidence constitutes deficient performance by trial counsel. Knutsen v. State,
144 Idaho 433, 443 (Ct. App. 2007) (determining that the petitioner "raised a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to
investigate and present [mitigating] evidence") (emphasis added). Additionally, strongly
implied in Mr. Grant's assertions is the idea that, had the district court been presented
with this evidence, there is a reasonable possibility that Mr. Grant would have received
13

In a clear demonstration of the Catch-22 to which the district court subjected
Mr. Grant in regard to sufficiently articulating his claims, the district court found that
Mr. Grant had presented no evidence to support his own allegations as to whether he
might have been accepted into the mental health court program (R., p.96), but would
not give him counsel to help investigate the viability of that claim by obtaining the
necessary evidence (which Mr. Grant alleged existed, but was unattainable by him due
to his incarceration). (See, e.g., R., p.53.) In essence, in order to get counsel
appointed, the district court required Mr. Grant to provide evidence that it was not
possible for him to get without the assistance of counsel.
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a more lenient sentence.
and unrefuted facts Mr. Grant

demonstrate

possibility

a valid claim for

post-conviction relief, counsel should have been appointed and the decision to deny him
counsel was in error.
Furthermore, the idea that Mr. Grant's answers on the guilty plea questionnaire
conclusively disprove these allegations (see R., p.1 02), is illogical, since the actions
which are alleged to be deficient occurred after Mr. Grant had filled out the
questionnaires. (See R., pp.58-59.) Mr. Grant could not have known or complained of
the deficient performance at the sentencing hearing at
questionnaire

the change of

hearing.

time he filled

the guilty

district cou

use of the

guilty plea questionnaire in evaluating this claim (see R., p.99) was erroneous. At any
rate, the claim is still potentially valid despite any information in the answers to the guilty
plea questionnaire to the contrary.

See Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 457. Since Mr. Grant

alleged facts demonstrating the possibility of a valid claim in this regard, the district
court erred by not appointing him an attorney.

F.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Move For A
Change Of Venue Or Disqualification Of The Presiding Judge
Mr. Grant asserted that his attorney should have moved for a change of venue or

to disqualify the presiding judge because of specific prejudicial circumstances.

For

example, Mr. Grant alleged that the victim's mother may have been able to influence the
investigation based on her position within the police department and that the presiding
judge may have had a bias against Mr. Grant based upon the judge's past
representation of Mr. Grant's brother. (See R., p.52) The district court dismissed that
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to the district court, there was no evidence in the record which would
the basis for such a claim. (R., pp.35-36.)
In regard to its decision that the claim was not viable in post conviction, the
district court cited State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 923 (1982) (hereinafter, Carter 1).
However, the decision in Carter I was abrogated when a new trial was granted pursuant
to a successful post-conviction action.

See Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788 (1985)

Carter//). In Carter II, the Supreme Court explained

decision in Carter I

regarding the propriety of the challenge to counsel's failure to move to change venue:
[T]he alleged deficiencies fell into the area of strategic and tactical choices
that the record was "devoid of any indication that such choices were a
result of inadequate preparation or ignorance of counsel. Absent such
evidence" we held "it must be presumed that defense counsel's actions
were not [ineffective]." However, and of crucial importance to the present
proceeding, we went on to state that, "If evidence to the contrary is
available outside the record, it may be presented only by way of a petition
for post-conviction relief .... " This is precisely what appellant has done in
the present case. Thus, it would be anomalous for us to hold, after
directing appellant that the proper way to pursue his claim was through a
petition for post-conviction relief, that post conviction relief is now
barred ....
/d. at 792 (quoting Carter I, 103 Idaho at 923). Therefore, while the decision of whether

or not to request a change of venue is a tactical decision that will usually not be
reviewed in post-conviction, see, e.g., State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 170, 175 (Ct. App. 1993),
Carter II provides that challenges to such decisions may appropriately be raised in post

conviction, if backed by sufficient evidence. Carter II, 108 Idaho at 792.
In regard to its determination that there was no evidence supporting Mr. Grant's
allegations of bias, the district court cited to Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 333 (Ct. App.
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1998). (R, p.36.) However, in Small, the applicant had failed to point to any
"which might reveal the district court's bias." Small, 1

Idaho at

there was no evidence which would demonstrate that the attorney had
unreasonable by not requesting the judge's recusal.

See id.

Thus,
objectively

In this case, however,

Mr. Grant has pointed to specific evidence which might reveal bias on the part of the
district court, and so, Mr. Grant articulated the possibility of a valid claim, and thus,
should have at least had the aid of an attorney to fully investigate and pursue that
argument in post-conviction.

See Marlinez, 132 U.S. at 1317; Swader, 143 Idaho at

654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.
As

, Mr. Grant alleged facts which, if true, demonstrate that

decision to

not request a change of venue was objectively unreasonable. (See R., p.52.) Those
allegations also imply the argument that the decision to not challenge venue caused
prejudice to Mr. Grant through the loss of due process and a neutral magistrate.
Therefore, Mr. Grant alleged facts which demonstrate the possibility of a valid claim.

Compare Carler II, 108 Idaho at 792. As a result, counsel should have been appointed,
and the decision to deny that request was in error.

G.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Inducing His Guilty Plea
With The Assurance That Jurisdiction Would Be Retained While He Participated
In The Rider Program
If an attorney provides his client with advice which goes beyond the range of

competence demanded of attorneys during the plea process, that advice may deprive
the plea of the requisite voluntariness. Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 884 (Ct. App.
2008).

To prove prejudice, the applicant must demonstrate a reasonable probability
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that, absent the deficient advice, he would have insisted on proceeding to trial.
Initially, Mr.

failed to articulate the "false

the deficient advice he claimed occurred. (R., pp.7,

/d.

which would demonstrate
44~45.)

However, in his response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, he
clarified his claim, alleging in his verified amended pleadings that his attorney told him
the district court had agreed in a meeting in chambers to impose concurrent sentences
that would not exceed a unified term of ten years with four years fixed, and also that trial
counsel told him he could expect a period of retained jurisdiction. (R., p.57.) Mr. Grant
also stated in his verified amended pleadings that, but for those assurances, there was
strong likelihood"

he would

insisted on proceeding to trial. (R.,

present the possibility of a valid claim. See Nevarez, 1

those

.) If
Idaho

at 884. Therefore, counsel should have been appointed and the decision to deny him
counsel was in error.

H.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate A Possible Viable Claim That He
Was Incompetent To Enter A Knowing, Voluntary, And Intelligent Guilty Plea
In post-conviction actions where the petitioner is claiming a guilty plea is invalid

because he was not competent when it was entered, the petitioner must "present
admissible evidence showing that there is a reasonable probability that he was
incompetent at the time he entered his plea" in order to succeed on a claim of
incompetence.

Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 678 (2009).

To demonstrate

incompetence, an applicant must show that he lacked "the capacity to [(1 )] understand
the

proceedings

against him and

(2) assist

in

his

defense."'

/d.

(quoting

State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 842 (1975) (citing Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960))).
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Mr. Grant alleged that
He also

was incompetent due to his mental health issues.

'pp.5,

the district court that various medical records would support

his allegations but, due to his incarceration, he was unable to provide them to the
district court. 14 (R., p.57.) These alleged

demonstrate the possibility of a valid

claim that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. As such, counsel should
have been appointed and the decision to deny him counsel was in error.
As with Mr. Grant's allegations in terms of his Estrada rights (see Section 111(8),
supra), the district court attempted to justify its actions based on the form guilty plea

questionnaire.

(R., p.1 02.)

However, as explained supra, that information does

not

that

failed to allege

claim.

Fraser,

showing the possibility of a valid

S.W.3d at 457. Since Mr. Grant alleged facts which gave rise to

the possibility of valid claims, he should have been appointed counsel.
Ultimately, since the facts Mr. Grant alleged in his verified pleadings show the
possibility of multiple viable post-conviction claims, the district court's decision to deny
Mr. Grant the assistance of post-conviction counsel was erroneous. As such, this Court
should vacate the district court's order denying the appointment of counsel, as well as
the order summarily dismissing the petition, and remand this case for further
proceedings with the assistance of counsel.

14

As the Idaho Supreme Court noted, such offers of proof could be considered to
corroborate the applicant's statements if they spoke to the applicant's incompetency
during the relevant period of time (the change of plea hearing). Ridgley, 148 Idaho at
678. It is also one of the reasons that the United States Supreme Court has identified
as revealing why such petitioners "likely need" the assistance of post-conviction
counsel. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317; Charboneau /, 140 Idaho at 792-93.
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IV.
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Grant's Petition For PostConviction Relief Without Properly Considering The Undisputed Factual Allegations He
Made In His Verified Petition And Affidavit In Support Of That Petition
A.

Introduction
In addition to its failure to provide post-conviction counsel when it was merited,

the district court also applied the wrong standards when it summarily dismissed
Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction relief. In a continuing theme, the district court did
not recognize that the facts set forth in Mr. Grant's verified statements and pleadings, as
well as the attached affidavits in support of his petition, constituted evidence that the
district court

to consider when determining

genuine issues of material fact. It also failed to

Mr. Grant had pled a
that when these statements of

fact went unrefuted by the State (which never filed an answer in this case), it was
required to accept those statements of fact as true for purposes of summary disposition.
Additionally, those facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom had to be construed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party {i.e., Mr. Grant). A proper application
of these standards also shows that Mr. Grant presented several genuine issues of
material fact which, if true, would entitle him to relief. As such, summary dismissal was
improper and this case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

B.

The District Court Failed To Apply The Proper Standards Or Recognize What
Evidence It Could Consider, And So Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Grant's
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
The district court committed reversible error by failing to recognize the evidence

available for its consideration (the facts Mr. Grant himself alleged to be true) or giving
that evidence its proper weight (presumed true, as they were undisputed). See Mata,
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124 Idaho at 593; Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. Therefore, its repeated assertions that
claims demonstrates error,

there was no admissible evidence supporting Mr.
affecting the whole decision. (See, e.g., R., pp.31, 37,

) As such, its determinations

on all the specific issues are tainted beyond reconciliation and this Court should remand
this case for a proper determination under the proper standards.

See, e.g.,

Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900 (2007) (hereinafter, Charboneau II).
In terms of summary dismissal in post-conviction actions, the Idaho Supreme
Court has clarified that only "[w]hen the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle
the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without an evidentiary
hearing." Charboneau II, 144 Idaho

903. Therefore, if

alleged facts, if assumed

to be true, would support the claim, summary dismissal is inappropriate. /d. Among the
that the district court may consider, according to the Idaho Supreme Court, are
verified facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant set forth in "affidavits,
records or other evidence."

/d.; Mata, 124 Idaho at 593.

According to the Court of

Appeals, "[a] verified pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts within the personal
knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an affidavit, and is accorded the
same probative force as an affidavit." Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. As such, the allegations
in the verified filings alone can provide evidence "sufficient to raise a factual issue
requiring an evidentiary hearing." Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. Thus, the verified
pleadings alone can provide the prima facie showing to overcome summary dismissal.

/d.
Nevertheless, the district court failed to apply those rules and determined that
most of Mr. Grant's allegations were not supported by sufficient evidence, instead
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of the fact that they were

determining that his allegations were bare,
in verified pleadings and affidavits. (See,

'pp.37, 38, 39, 41,

forth

44, 46, 47,

90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106.) The fact that the allegations were
bare does not mean that the district court was free to ignore them - the question it had
to consider was whether those allegations, bare though they may have been, if
presumed to be true, 15 would entitle Mr. Grant to relief. Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at
903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. Mr. Grant's allegations met that standard, and so he
should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing.
For example, in regard to Mr. Grant's claim regarding his Estrada rights, the
district court stated:

"However,

Grant

presented no admissible evidence to

demonstrate his counsel failed to advise him properly regarding his rights to his
participation in the psychological examination. Instead the Petitioner has only set forth
unsubstantiated and unverified claims, which provide no relief under the Uniform Post
Conviction Procedure Act."

(R., p.98 (emphasis added).)

This reasoning is clearly

erroneous because Mr. Grant alleged in his pleadings that his attorney did not advise
him about his Estrada rights. 16
verified.

(R., pp.?, 60.)

(R., pp.3, 6.)

Those petitions and affidavits were

As such, those allegations constituted admissible, verified

15

To presume a claim to be true means that the claim is considered to be accurate,
even if other evidence might suggest otherwise. Where, as here, the district court
summarily dismisses a claim based on potentially contradictory evidence, it has
erroneously applied the presumption of accuracy to the other evidence, not to the claim
being evaluated. Practically speaking, all the potentially contradictory evidence does in
the face of an appropriately-applied presumption is create a genuine issue of material
fact. If a genuine issue of material fact exists, an evidentiary hearing is a necessity.
See, e.g., Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 157. Therefore, when the presumption is accurately
applied, the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Grant's petition.
1
A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence in the record. Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003).
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evidence supporting his claim for relief.

Mata, 1

court's decision to summarily dismiss

Idaho at 593.

rtherrnore, the

"Mr. Grant

no

'"'"'J{"'u

admissible evidence to demonstrate his counsel failed to advise him properly regarding
his rights prior to his participation in the psychological examination," and because "the
Petitioner has set forth unsubstantiated and unverified claims, which can provide no
relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Act" (R., p.98), is directly contrary to
established precedent, which provides that the verified petitions alone may be the basis
for relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. 17 Charboneau II, 144 Idaho
at 903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Mata, 124 Idaho

593.

The only evidence,

in a verified petition, was that Mr. Grant's attorney failed to
of his Estrada rights.

Estrada

Mr. Grant to relief. See also Murray, 1

it clear that, if true, that claim

Grant
entitle

Idaho at 167. Therefore, presuming the claim

to be true (particularly as it was unrebutted by the State), the district court erred in
summarily dismissing the petition. Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho
at 153.
As another example, the district court stated that "Mr. Grant also submitted the
Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss, which did not include any
additional documents or affidavits."

(R., p.86.)

This is another clearly erroneous

determination, since the Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss

17

The undue limitation of information that may be properly considered (i.e., the district
court's refusal to consider the facts set forth in Mr. Grant's verified filings because they
were just his assertions) constitutes an abuse of discretion by the district court.
Cf. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 824 (2008). As the district court has unduly
limited its consideration of the evidence before it, it has abused its discretion in this
manner, further justifying remanding this case for further proceedings. See id.
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was notarized. (R., p.60.) As such, it was essentially an affidavit. Mata, 1

Idaho at

Critically, this assertion by the district court came before it began discussing any
of Mr. Grant's individual claims, which indicates that the erroneous rationale was
applied to all the ensuing subsections. As a result of numerous misapplications of the
Mata standard, both generally and to specific claims, the district court's errors

significantly undermined the entire decision.
Even when the district court did accept the evidence Mr. Grant presented, it did
not give it the appropriate weight.
accepted

If the allegations are unrefuted, they must be

for purposes of summary disposition. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 1

did not file an answer in this case.

(See generally R.)

The

As such, Mr. Grant's

allegations were never refuted. Therefore, at least for purposes of summary disposition,
Mr. Grant's factual allegations had to be accepted as true. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153.
Furthermore, in summary disposition proceedings, the facts and all reasonable
inferences therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.

Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903.

However, the district court reviewed the

evidence in the light least favorable to Mr. Grant, determining that the evidence was
insufficient or that Mr. Grant had failed to prove the allegations. (See, e.g., R., pp.39,
40, 41, 48, 98, 100, 104) At the summary judgment phase, a petitioner is not required
to prove his claim; rather, the petitioner is required to show that claim exists which, if he
can prove it at a subsequent evidentiary hearing, 18 would entitle him to relief.

18

If the petitioner is required to prove his claim in his initial pleadings, then there is
never a reason to hold an evidentiary hearing. That result would have serious due
process implications, as doing away with evidentiary hearings altogether would likely
deprive the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. It would also run afoul of
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Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. If Mr. Grant's uncontested allegations are properly

accepted as true, then Mr. Grant has sufficiently proved his allegations so as to merit an
evidentiary hearing. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903.
Again, by not following this precedent, the district court erred in such a way as to
undermine its

decision.

If Mata, Baldwin, and Charboneau II are properly applied in this case, it is clear
that Mr. Grant's verified pleadings and affidavits present several genuine issues of
material fact in regard to some, if not all, of his claims.
material fact requ

C.

Those genuine issues of

an evidentiary hearing to sort out. See Franck- Teet v. State, 143

The District Court Failed To Apply The Appropriate Standards Regarding The
Prejudice Prong Of The Strickland Test When It SummaritLJ21smissed
Mr. Grant's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
In wrapping up its discussion of the individual claims, the district court stated "the

Petitioner still failed to demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no compelling argument
that the outcome of his case would have been different but for his attorney's errors."
(R., p.106.) This statement imputes the erroneous standard to all of Mr. Grant's claims.
In addition, the district court's additional requirement of a "compelling argument" is also
erroneous at the summary judgment proceedings, as Mr. Grant need only demonstrate
that, if true, his factual allegations would support his claims.

Baldwin, 145 Idaho at

153. The determination of whether the argument is compelling (i.e., proven to a
sufficiency of the evidence) is one appropriately left until after the evidentiary hearing,

the statutory procedure governing post-conviction, which provides for a hearing when
the petitioner establishes a genuine issue of material fact. I.C. §§ 19-4906(b) & -4907.
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after Mr. Grant has had the full opportunity to make a compelling argument based on all
evidence, for which he needed the assistance of counsel. See Charboneau II, 144
Idaho at 903. As such, this is yet another clear demonstration of the district court's
erroneous actions in this case: the district court misinterpreted the prejudice prong of

Strickland in its analysis of Mr. Grant's allegations.
To demonstrate prejudice, the applicant need only demonstrate that "there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
(emphasis added).
outcome "would

the district court required

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
Mr. Grant

that

been different but for his attorney's unprofessional errors." 19

e.g., R., pp.47; see also R., pp.95, 96, 106.) The district court's requirement that
Mr. Grant demonstrate that the outcome would have been different placed a far more
onerous burden on him than the one actually levied by the law: Strickland only requires
the applicant to demonstrate the possibility that the outcome might change, whereas,
under the district court's standard, Mr. Grant would have to prove the outcome would
actually have changed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Therefore, to meet that burden,
Mr. Grant needed only to undermine confidence in the outcome (i.e., make it less

19

To this same end, the district court was requiring Mr. Grant to prove his allegations by
a preponderance of the evidence. (See, e.g., R., pp.37, 39) That burden is premature
since demonstrating a reasonable probability of a different result establishes the
genuine issue of material fact justifying a hearing. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. It is
at that subsequent evidentiary hearing that he is required to prove his claims by a
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Nguyen v. State, 121 Idaho 257, 258
(Ct. App. 1992) ("In a post-conviction relief hearing, the petitioner has the burden of
proving the allegations which entitle him to relief by a preponderance of the evidence."
(emphasis added)).
38

certain as the result), not affirmatively
Strickland,

an alternative outcome would have come to

U.S. at 694.

If Baldwin and Strickland are properly applied in this case, it is clear that
Mr. Grant's verified pleadings and affidavits present sufficient allegations of prejudice in
regard to

if not all, of his claims.

As such, the failure to comply with those

standards demonstrates the need to vacate the summary dismissal order and remand
the case for an evidentiary hearing.

D.

As discussed in Section Ill, supra, Mr.

alleged facts demonstrating

possibility of several valid claims. In regard to some of them, his verified pleadings also
alleged sufficient facts that demonstrate genuine issues of material fact, which should
have entitled him to an evidentiary hearing on those issues. However, on others, the
record does not contain sufficient facts to make that assertion, usually because the
prejudice caused by trial counsel's errors, while implied, was not actually articulated. 20
However, they should remain viable issues on remand, since presumably, given the
assistance of counsel, Mr. Grant could file an amended petition articulating that
prejudice and presenting genuine issues of material fact in regard to those claims.

20

Issues in this situation include, but are not limited to, Mr. Grant's claim that his
attorney was ineffective for not reviewing the PSI with him or assisting him to object to
erroneous or unreliable information therein (see Section 111(0), supra), Mr. Grant's claim
that his attorney was ineffective for not presenting certain, articulated, mitigating
evidence (see Section III(E), supra), and Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney was
ineffective for failing to move for a change of venue or recusal of the district court judge
(see Section III(F), supra).
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However, as there are some issues in which Mr. Grant did allege, at least,
of material

genuine

district court's decision to summarily dismiss the

petition was erroneous and should be reversed.

1.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts That, If Accepted As True, Would Entitle Him To
Relief Because His Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing To Advise Him Of
His Right To Remain Silent During The Presentence Investigations, Per
The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision In Estrada

As explained in Section III(C), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that his attorney's performance was deficient, failing
to inform him of his right to remain silent during the psychological examinations.
(R., pp.3, 6,

)

r. Grant also

that information obtained during this interview

was used against him at his sentencing hearing. (R., p.54.) As such, those verified
facts and reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in Mr. Grant's
favor, would entitle him to relief for the ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561. Therefore, summary denial on that claim
was inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

See

Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903.

2.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts That, If Accepted As True, Would Entitle Him To
Relief Because His Attorney Was Ineffective By Inducing Him To Plead
Guilty Based On False Assurances Regarding His Potential Sentence

As explained in Section III(G), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that his attorney provided deficient representation by
inducing him to plead guilty based on false assurances as to the potential overall length
of his sentence and his initial participation in the rider program. (R., p.57.) As such, this
robbed his guilty plea of the necessary voluntariness. See Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 884.
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He also alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this deficient
performance, as he

in his verified response to the notice of intent to dismiss

that there was "a strong likelihood" that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial.
(R., p.58.) Since Mr. Grant need only undermine confidence in the outcome (in this
case, the decision to plead guilty) to show prejudice, that verified allegation is sufficient
to meet the requirement from Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As such,
those verified facts and reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in
Mr. Grant's favor, present a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, summary denial
on that claim was inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

Relief Because His Guilty Plea Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently, And
Voluntarily Entered
As explained in Section III(H), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily
enter his guilty plea based on the fact that he was suffering a severe depressive
episode associated with his mental health conditions. As such, those verified facts and
reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in Mr. Grant's favor,
would entitle him to relief. See Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 678. Therefore, they present a
genuine issue of material fact, and thus, summary dismissal on that claim was
inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
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CONCLUSION
Grant respectfully requests that this Court

its review authority in this

case. On review, he respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying him
the assistance of counsel, vacate the order summarily dismissing his post-conviction
petition, and remand this case for further proceedings. Additionally, because the district
court erroneously summarily dismissed at least some of his claims, he respectfully
requests this Court instruct that an evidentiary hearing be among the future
proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of June, 2014.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

42

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
CERTIFY that on this 13th day of June, 2014, I
a true and
I H
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REVIEW, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
WOODROW JOHN GRANT
INMATE# 80692
ICC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE 10 83707
ROBERT C NAFTZ
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRI

EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas

43

